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 Risk assessment plays a crucial role in aviation decision making and, ultimately, 
in ensuring safe flight operations.  Many aircraft accidents and incidents seem to reflect 
inadequate risk assessment by the flight crew that subsequently led to inappropriate 
action decisions.  In addition to inexperience, several operational factors within the 
aviation environment as well organizational pressures within an airline may make pilots’ 
risk assessment difficult, thus increasing the chance of errors.  For instance, dynamically 
changing weather conditions and ambiguous problem cues complicate risk assessment 
and thus place considerable cognitive demands on pilots as they have to continuously 
update their situation model or keep conflicting models in mind.  Moreover, the presence 
of economic pressures from their company may induce pilots to view safety threats in a 
more optimistic light than they would do if these pressures were absent.   
 The proposed research has two objectives.  (1) Identify central factors in the flight 
environment that influence pilots’ risk assessment and determine their individual and 
joint effects.  And (2) Identify potential weaknesses in pilots’ risk assessment.  What 
factors or clusters of factors impede risk assessment?  How do they adversely affect risk 
assessment?  Two studies were conducted to address these objectives.  Details of this 
research can be found in the attached manuscript entitled “Operational Factors 
Influencing Pilots’ Risk Assessment and Management” in preparation for submission to a 
peer-reviewed journal. 
 One study involved pilots from a major U.S. carrier; participants in the other 
study were pilots from a national U.S. carrier.  Participants in both studies were asked to 
verbalize their concerns and reasoning while deciding on how to proceed in two 
hypothetical decision situations.  The scenarios, one on take-off, one on approach, 
presented pilots with ambiguous weather conditions, uncertain outcomes, and goal 
conflicts.  Transcripts of audiotapes from participants were coded and analyzed. Analyses 
indicate that concerns for flight safety featured prominently in most pilots’ decision 
making, while organizational pressures were not consistently addressed.  All pilots were 
aware of the safety risks in both scenarios and all pilots chose a course of action that they 
thought would eliminate that risk or at least reduce it to an acceptable level.  Across the 
two scenarios three risk management strategies were discerned: avoid the safety risk 
altogether (e.g., divert to alternate), control the safety risk by reducing its likelihood (e.g., 
request priority handling), or plan for the worst case, thereby mitigating the impact of the 
negative consequence (e.g., implement windshear procedures).  While the first strategy 
takes account only of the safety risk, the latter two strategies satisfy economic and 
productivity concerns as well.  Which risk management strategy pilots ultimately chose 
in each scenario reflected differences in their assessment of the safety risk rather than 
personality characteristics or pilot experience.   
 Differences between pilots’ assessment of the safety risk apparently resulted from 
the ambiguity of the problem cues and the uncertainties concerning outcomes.  While 
pilots in the Approach Scenario who continued with the approach talked more about the 
curfew than those who diverted, they talked just as much about the weather and fuel 
situation as their more cautious colleagues, albeit in a more optimistic manner.  In a 
similar vein, pilots who continued in the Takeoff Scenario did not show any greater 
concern with external pressures than those who delayed the departure, but their talk about 
safety related issues was more positive.  External pressures, such as the schedule delay or 
long line of planes behind them, were hardly mentioned by pilots in the Takeoff Scenario, 
no matter what their final decision.  Instead, pilots based their decisions on different 
interpretations of the same weather cues.  If they considered the threat to flight safety to 
be serious, they took a cautious approach and adopted a new course of action.  On the 
other hand, if they painted a less negative picture, they continued with their original plan 
but took actions to mitigate the risk. 
 Corporate differences were found in pilots’ use of risk mitigation strategies and decision 
consistency across situations. Pilots from the major carrier seem to be more responsive to the 
specifics of a situation as their decisions varied across the scenarios.  In contrast, pilots from the 
national carrier were more likely to select the same option across the two scenarios, usually the 
riskier one.  In addition, they were less likely than their colleagues from the major carrier to 
mitigate the safety risk associated with their decision.  This pattern of findings may reflect 
differences between the two carriers in corporate climate, nature of their typical operations, pilot 
selection procedures, or training.   
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Objective: Two studies were conducted to examine pilots’ responses to risk and the 
factors that influence their decisions.  Background: Analyses of aviation accident 
revealed a particular class of decision errors, called plan continuation errors, that 
involved decisions by flight crews to continue with their flight as planned despite 
evidence suggesting to change that plan.  One explanation of these errors centers on 
pilots’ decision frames; i.e., pilots stress economic losses resulting from a change and 
thus proceed as originally planned.  Alternatively, pilots’ plan continuation errors may 
reflect inadequate or inappropriate risk perception or assessment. Methods:  30 pilots 
from a major U.S. carrier, and 31 pilots from a national U.S. carrier participated in the 
research.  Participants received two realistic decision scenarios involving decision 
dilemmas (safety vs. economy goals) and ambiguous and uncertain conditions.  
Participants were asked to verbalize their thoughts while deciding on how to proceed in 
each situation.  Sessions were audiotaped and transcribed for content analysis.  Results:  
Logistic regression analyses indicate that inappropriately optimistic risk assessment 
rather than a decision frame highlighting economic losses may be a dominant factor in 
pilots’ plan continuation errors.  Differences between the pilot groups concerned pilots’ 
risk mitigation strategies and the consistency of their risk tolerance across decision 
situations.  Application: Implications of these findings for pilots’ risk management 
training are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Decision making under risk, Framing of outcomes, Risk assessment. 
Why Do Pilots Take Risks?   
Some Insights From A Think-Aloud Study 
 Safe flight depends on effective decision making.  While decision errors by flight 
crews are relatively infrequent in everyday flight, they tend to be more consequential than 
other types of errors, often resulting in unsafe aircraft states (Helmreich, Klinect, & 
Wilhelm, 2001).  Improper crew decision making has been implicated in 68% of aircraft 
accidents occurring between 1978 and 1990 (NTSB, 1994).  Three-quarters of these 
errors were subsequently classified as plan continuation errors; i.e., instances in which 
the crew decided to continue with a plan of action despite evidence suggesting that their 
original plan should be modified (Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 2001). The following 
accident description illustrates this type of decision error: 
 The charter flight departed Los Angeles International for Aspen-Pitkin County Airport 
(ASE), Aspen, Colorado, 41 minutes late, pushing the estimated arrival time at ASE to 
just 12 minutes before the airport's nighttime landing curfew.  When the charter customer 
was informed about the possibility of a diversion, he became irate and stressed the 
importance of landing at ASE this evening.  During the flight’s initial descent, the crew 
was told that visibility at the airport was deteriorating and they heard three of the four 
aircraft ahead of them report conducting missed approaches.  As the crew continued with 
the approach, they indicated that they had visual contact with the runway to the right of 
the aircraft.  According to radar data, the airport was actually to the left of the airplane 
at that time.  Shortly afterward, the airplane crashed into sloping terrain about 2,400 feet 
short of the runway threshold (NTSB, 2002). 
 
Decision frames as a possible cause of pilots’ plan-continuation errors 
Why do pilots sometimes continue with a flight as planned even though this 
course of action carries a potential safety risk?  One possible answer is based on prospect 
theory which explains people’s preference for risk seeking or risk averse options in terms 
of distinct decision frames (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Decision frames in this context 
reflect how people conceive of the outcomes associated with an option, in particular 
whether they think of them as gains or losses.  If the wording of available options focuses 
on adverse consequences (i.e., lives lost), people tend to be risk seeking.  That is, they are 
willing to adopt an uncertain option if it entails the possibility of no loss (e.g., “no one 
may die”) rather than accept a moderate but sure loss (e.g., “1/3 of the affected 
population will die”).  On the other hand, if the same options are framed as gains (i.e., 
they highlight the number of lives saved), then people are “risk averse” and prefer the 
moderate but sure gain (“2/3 of the affected population will be saved”) to the gamble 
(“everybody may be saved”).   
Prospect theory thus suggests that accidents like the one in Aspen, Colorado, 
happen because pilots focus on the economic losses associated with available options 
while disregarding or at least de-emphasizing the safety benefits of a change in the flight 
plan.  Accordingly one might speculate that the pilots in the Aspen accident proceeded 
with the approach because if successful, this action would mean no economic loss: the 
customer would be satisfied and his continued business ensured.  Diverting to another 
airport may not have been seen by the crew as a viable alternative since it would likely 
have entailed negative economic consequences:  an irate customer and a future loss in 
revenues.  A study by O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) examining the effect of framing on 
private pilots’ weather-related decisions, provides some support for this explanation.  
While pilots’ initial choice of decision frame was not significantly related to their 
subsequent decision, prompting them to consider the safety benefits of a diversion or, 
alternatively, to think about the money and time already invested in the flight did affect 
their preference for risk averse or risk tolerant options.  
Pilots’ risk perception and assessment as possible causes of plan continuation errors 
An alternative explanation of pilots’ plan continuation errors reflects recent work 
on decision making in real world contexts that emphasizes the active role of decision 
makers in interpreting environmental cues prior to selecting a course of action (Endsley, 
2000; Huber, 1997; Klein et al., 1993; Montgomery, 1994).  In contrast to prospect 
theory’s emphasis on the end point of the decision making process and its assumption of 
known risks, this explanation centers on the pre-decisional phase and examines how 
initial risk appraisal influences subsequent decisions.  While subjects in framing studies 
receive a well-defined problem (e.g., an unknown Asian disease that affects 600 people), 
many real world problems do not come as neatly packaged.  Instead, prior to deciding on 
how best to respond to a risk, people first have to acknowledge that they are faced with 
an event that is potentially threatening.  Risk appraisal further entails judging the 
seriousness and the likelihood of a negative outcome (Yates & Stone, 1992).  This 
account of people’s risk taking behavior suggests that pilots’ plan continuation errors are 
the result of inappropriate risk perception or assessment.  That is, pilots may continue 
with a flight as planned because they miss or misinterpret relevant cues in the 
environment and thus fail to perceive the potential threat associated with this course of 
action. Or, they may erroneously assume that a threat is not really serious or is unlikely to 
lead to a negative outcome.  Studies of factors underlying private pilots’ decisions to 
continue into hazardous airspace identified these problems in pilots’ risk perception and 
assessment. Pilots who opted to stay with their original flight plan were more likely to 
have missed significant changes in the flight environment (Muthard & Wickens, 2002), 
and were found to report greater optimism about weather conditions than pilots who had 
decided to divert (Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2002).  Both inadequate risk perception 
and risk assessment may also have been factors in the Aspen accident.  As evident in the 
cockpit voice recording, the pilots mistook lights to the right of the airport as runway 
lights leading them to believe that they could see the airfield and by implication that the 
weather conditions had improved.  In addition, they apparently focused more on the one 
aircraft that had landed successfully before them than on the three previous aircraft that 
had discontinued their approaches  
The alternative explanations of pilots’ risk taking behavior and their implications 
are summarized in Figure 1. As shown in the top half (I), the framing perspective 
maintains that all pilots have a common understanding of the nature and seriousness of 
the threats, but prefer different options depending on whether they focus on safety 
benefits or economic losses.  In contrast, the risk assessment perspective (II) maintains 
that pilots who avoid or accept risk differ in their problem understanding, i.e., in their 
attention to safety-related cues in the flight environment and in their judgments of the 
severity of the threats to safety.   
Factors influencing pilots’ risk perception and assessment 
Pilots’ risk perception or assessment may be influenced by individual factors, 
such as familiarity and experience with a threat, as well as attitude toward risk, and 
personal beliefs concerning competence and control (Slovic, 1987; Yates & Stone, 1992). 
While there has been little empirical support for the notion of a risk taking personality, 
attitudes toward risk were found to be fairly consistent within specific domains, such as 
business, health, or recreational activities, and to influence perception of risk in these 
domains accordingly (Weber, Blais & Betz, 2002).  For instance, Sitkin and Weingart 
(1995) observed that subjects who reported higher levels of risk propensity perceived less 
situational risk and were thus more inclined to accept a risky proposition than subjects 
who reported lower levels of risk propensity.  Optimistic risk assessment, moreover, may 
also reflect overconfidence in one’s abilities to control the risk (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; 
Wilson & Fallshore, 2001).  
The subjective nature of risk perception and assessment is heightened in the 
aviation environment where pilots routinely make decisions based on incomplete, vague, 
or conflicting information about current and future states of the environment (Orasanu, 
Martin & Davison, 2001).  Analyzing weather-related incidents involving commercial 
pilots, Bernhard et al. (2003) observed that relevant cues were often ambiguous and that 
ambiguity was frequently associated with plan continuation errors.  This finding suggests 
that ambiguity and uncertainty may impede pilots’ risk perception and assessment, 
leading to decisions that in hindsight turn out to be ill chosen. When crucial information 
is missing, when conflicting cues are present, or when conditions are rapidly changing, 
pilots may continue with their current course of action because they do not “see” 
sufficient information to tell them a change is warranted.  
In addition to individual factors and environmental conditions, commercial pilots’ 
perception and assessment of a safety threat may also be influenced by organizational 
pressures relating to company productivity, economics, and safety culture.  For example, 
companies may emphasize fuel economy and getting passengers to their destinations 
rather than diverting, thus inadvertently sending mixed messages to their pilots 
concerning the relative importance of safety versus productivity. Mixed messages create 
goal conflicts for flight crews that are difficult to resolve.  In a risk survey pilots reported 
that their most difficult decisions were those in which safety was pit against economic or 
passenger considerations (Orasanu, Davison, & Fischer, 2001). The presence of 
organizational pressures, in turn, may render pilots’ risk perception and assessment 
vulnerable to biased information processing leading to risky actions, at times with fatal 
consequences as in the Aspen accident.  While trying to accommodate organizational 
goals such as customer satisfaction, pilots may underestimate the seriousness of a safety 
threat and continue with their flight as planned.  
As shown in Figure 1, organizational pressures may also play a role in 
establishing decision frames (Part I).  In this context organizational pressures are 
assumed not to bias pilots’ risk perception and assessment, but instead to influence how 
they think about available options.  Specifically, organizational pressures may highlight 
the economic implications of available options:  deviations from the original flight plan 
will lead to sure economic losses that ought to be avoided.  Adherence to the original 
flight plan, in contrast, would be judged favorably as this course of action might bring no 
economic loss.   
Predictions 
The present research was conducted to examine commercial pilots’ decision 
making in ambiguous problem situations that pitted flight safety against economic 
pressures.  While past research addressed risky decisions by private pilots and assessed 
their cognitions after a decision was made, our study involved commercial transport 
pilots and recorded their thoughts during the decision making process.  We focused on 
commercial pilots because they routinely make decisions that require them to balance 
multiple goals and risks, most notably flight safety and economic considerations.  Our 
research goal was to determine whether risk averse or risk tolerant decisions are the result 
of distinct decision frames or reflect differences in pilots’ perceptions and assessment of 
potential threats to flight safety.  Unlike past research that presented subjects with options 
highlighting their associated gains or losses, we examined whether in the course of 
deciding on how to proceed with a flight, pilots frame potential decision outcomes as 
gains or losses, and whether their self-generated decision frames predict their final 
decisions.  We hypothesized that if pilots focus on the negative economic implications 
associated with a change in plan, they will ultimately decide to continue with the flight as 
planned – thus favoring the riskier option.  If they stress the safety benefits of available 
options, they will opt for a change of plan because doing so will ensure flight safety.  On 
the other hand, if pilots’ decisions are motivated by differences in risk perception and 
assessment, we hypothesized that all pilots –irrespective of their final decision—will be 
concerned about flight safety.  However, risk averse pilots will consider the threat to 
flight safety as more serious than risk taking pilots.    
Method 
Participants 
Thirty pilots (13 captains and 17 first officers) from a major U.S. carrier, and 31 
pilots (15 captains and 16 first offices) from a national U.S. carrier volunteered to 
participate in the research.  Volunteers were recruited via flyers posted on bulletin boards 
at airlines’ training and operations centers, and were paid for their participation.  
Participants were treated in accordance with the ethical principles prescribed by the 
American Psychological Association (1992) for research involving human subjects.  The 
study’s procedure and consent form were approved by the Institutional Review Boards at 
the Georgia Institute of Technology and NASA Ames Research Center. 
Pilots from the major carrier were significantly older (F(1,53) = 16.54, p = .000) 
and more experienced in Part 121 (commercial air transport) operations (F(1,52) = 12.91, 
p = .001) than pilots form the national carrier1); however both age and experience effects 
varied by crew position (F(1,53) = 12.94, p = .001; F(1,52) = 16.93, p =  .000, 
respectively). While the captain groups differed in terms of age (MMajor = 53.38 yrs; 
MNational = 42.50 yrs.; (F(1,25) = 28.18,  p = .000) and time in Part 121 operations (MMajor 
= 16,930.77 hrs; MNational = 8,900 hrs.; F(1,24) = 16.65,  p = .000), no significant 
differences were observed between first officers with respect to their age (Age:  MMajor = 
38.67 yrs; MNational = 38.00 yrs.; F(1,28) = .12; ns) or experience (MMajor = 6,362.50 hrs; 
MNational = 6,907.14 hrs; F(1,28) = .34; ns).   
Scenarios and Study Design 
Two realistic decision scenarios were created involving decision dilemmas 
aggravated by ambiguous conditions and uncertain outcomes.  In both scenarios, 
continuing with the original plan posed a threat to flight safety.  However, if the original 
plan were successful, it would also bring economic and productivity gains (i.e., customer 
satisfaction and undisrupted flight operations, saving the company money).  On the other 
hand, changing the original plan would increase the margin of safety, but would also 
involve economic and productivity losses.   
One scenario presented study participants with a decision dilemma at takeoff:  As 
the aircraft moves up the takeoff queue, departure weather is deteriorating, and landing 
aircraft provide conflicting reports concerning windshear conditions.  A commuter jet 
landing on the departure runway reports a loss of 15 knots, while a B-757 subsequently 
landing on the same runway experiences only a 10 knot loss and a B-747 landing on the 
parallel runway reports no loss of airspeed.  In this situation pilots could decide to 
continue with takeoff although there was a possibility of windshear, or they could decide 
not to take any chances and delay their takeoff.  This course of action would mean they 
would go to the end of a long line of aircraft waiting to depart, thereby delaying their 
departure even more (the flight already had been delayed for four hours due to poor 
weather at the destination).  The second scenario involved a decision during approach to 
the destination airport: it is Christmas Eve, bad weather is delaying approaches, and a 
curfew is looming at the destination airport.  This situation entailed productivity (getting 
passengers where they want to go on an important holiday), safety (possibly running out 
of fuel), and economic risks (accommodating passengers on later flights, loss of business 
due to passenger dissatisfaction).  
Both scenarios consisted of an unfolding sequence of events reflecting progress 
over time.  While the scenarios involved maximally five events, they could be shorter if a 
participant decided to delay departure in the Takeoff Scenario or to divert to an alternate 
airport in the Approach Scenario prior to the last event.  At each point in the sequence, 
pilots could ask for more information than was presented in the event description, such as 
the current radar image or company input.  The kind of information pilots may request 
was determined in a preliminary study involving six senior pilots affiliated with crew 
training at two major U.S. airlines.  These senior pilots also helped in crafting the 
additional information so as to leave flight conditions ambiguous and uncertain.   
Procedure 
Experimental material was administered in two different modes.  In the study with 
pilots from the major carrier, experimental material was printed on flash cards and 
handed to study participants. The study with pilots from the national carrier involved 
computer presentation of the material.  Except for the presentation mode, all material and 
instructions were identical in the two studies.   
Participants were told that the scenarios progressed as a sequence of events; they 
were instructed to imagine they were the pilot flying, and to think aloud about their 
concerns and reasoning while they decided on how to proceed at each point in the 
evolving event.  Instructions to participants followed the procedure outlined in Ericsson 
and Simon (1993) and specified that “[b]y ‘think aloud’ we mean that you say aloud 
everything that in a normal flight situation you would think or do silently. That is, say 
aloud everything that you are reading and thinking when you view each event 
description. Be as spontaneous as possible.  Say aloud everything that you are 
considering:  any concerns you have, any consideration, even details or sidetracks that 
may seem insignificant.”  Instructions also stated that if participants wanted to obtain 
more information than was included in an event description, they should say so.  In the 
study involving flash cards, the researcher would then hand participants a card providing 
the requested information; in the computer-based version, the researcher would indicate 
which key (A through I) they needed to press.  Once participants made a preliminary 
decision, all material relating to this event was removed and they were presented with a 
new card or webpage describing the event that followed from their decision.  Sessions 
were audiotaped and later transcribed for content analysis.  Participants received both 
scenarios; their order of presentation was counterbalanced.  Prior to the experimental 
scenarios, participants received a training scenario to familiarize them with the materials 
and procedure.   
Coding the Think-Aloud Protocols 
The think-aloud protocols were segmented into idea units roughly corresponding 
to a sentence (main or subordinate clause) with a distinct topic or cognitive function 
(Hirokawa, 1983).  For the Takeoff Scenario, eight topics were identified.  Idea units 
were coded for reference to (1) the departure weather including winds, movement or 
location of storm cells, and intensity of rain; (2) reported or anticipated airspeed loss; (3) 
external pressures (i.e., four-hour delay, 20 aircraft in line waiting for takeoff, incurring 
further delay, passengers wanting to depart); (4) the operational environment (e.g., 
runway condition or length, departure path, time of day); (5) flight safety; (6) taking off 
(i.e., the possibility of taking off, takeoff procedures, or checklists); (7) delaying the  
departure; and (8) alternative courses of action such as changing the runway or departure 
path.  Topics in the Approach Scenario concerned (1) the destination weather; (2) fuel on 
board (i.e., the aircraft’s fuel status, consumption, or reserves); (3) external pressures 
(i.e., airport curfew, Christmas Eve, full flight, accommodating passengers); (4) the 
operational environment (i.e., runway length, spatial and global situational references); 
(5) the aircraft being in hold, the size of the holding pattern, or the duration of the hold; 
(6) flight safety; (7) the possibility of a diversion, the location of alternate airports, and 
their weather; and (8) the approach and landing at destination, plus required checklists.   
Pilots’ think-aloud protocols were coded both in terms of what they talked about 
and how they processed the information.  Functional codes assigned to idea units 
reflected categories relevant to problem solving and decision making.  These included 
requests for additional information about a particular topic (e.g., weather), status 
monitoring or review, situation evaluations (positive or negative), identification of 
conditions and limits for actions (e.g., wind speed and direction), contingency plans, 
intentions, and decisions.  Definitions and examples for the functional codes are provided 
in Table 1.   
Reliability of codes was established by the following procedure:  For each 
scenario 25 percent of the protocols ending with the decision to continue the flight (= risk 
taking), and 25 percent of those ending with the decision to adopt the safer alternative 
were independently coded by two raters in terms of their content.  Inter-rater reliabilities 
on the content codes for the Takeoff Scenario and Approach Scenario were 90.55 and 
90.17 percent, respectively.  Functional coding was validated on the sample from the 
Approach Scenario as the functional codes were the same for both scenarios; protocols 
for the Approach Scenario were generally longer (Midea units = 49.3) than those for the 
Takeoff Scenario (Midea units = 31.8; F(1,55) = 22.96, p = .000).  Inter-coder reliability for 
functional codes was 88.2 percent. 
Results 
Pilots’ Decisions 
The responses of four participants in the Takeoff Scenario, and of three 
participants in the Approach Scenario had to be excluded from our analyses due to 
technical problems or procedural errors. Table 2 displays the decision data for the 
remaining participants in the two scenarios.  As can be seen, in the Takeoff Scenario 
most of the pilots (73.7%) indicated that they would depart although there was a chance 
of windshear, thus choosing the riskier option in terms of safety (χ2(1, N = 57) = 12.79, p 
= .0003).  In contrast, no statistically significant preference for either course of action 
was observed in the Approach Scenario (χ2(1, N = 58) = 1.10, ns).  Table 2 also shows 
that the majority of pilots who were risk taking in the Takeoff Scenario (76.2%) adopted 
precautionary steps such as full power on takeoff to reduce the effect of possible 
windshear (χ2(1, N = 42) = 11.52, p = .0007).  In the Approach Scenario, strategies aimed 
at reducing the likelihood of fuel exhaustion were mentioned by half of the risk taking 
pilots (χ2(1, N = 25) = .04, ns); their strategies included requesting priority handling on 
approach or a closer alternate airport (to reduce fuel requirements for the current 
approach).   
Factors Influencing Pilots’ Decisions 
Pilots’ age, crew position and airline affiliation.  Logistic regression analyses 
were conducted to determine whether participants’ age predicted their decisions (risk 
taking versus risk averse).  According to the Wald criterion, no significant age effect was 
observed in either the Takeoff Scenario (z = .57, ns), or the Approach Scenario (z = .14, 
ns).   
Chi-Square analyses indicated that pilots’ decisions in the two scenarios did not 
differ by crew position or airline (Takeoff Scenario: (χ2Airline (1, N = 57) = 2.5, ns, and 
χ2Position (1, N = 57) = .64, ns; Approach Scenario: (χ2Airline (1, N = 58) = 1.76, ns, and  
χ2Position (1, N = 58) = .41, ns).   However, an airline effect was observed in pilots’ use of 
mitigation strategies.  Pilots from the major carrier who selected the riskier course of 
action were more likely than their colleagues from the national carrier to mention 
strategies they would use to control the safety risk.  In the Takeoff  Scenario, 89% of the 
risk taking pilots from the major carrier called for mitigation strategies as compared to 
67% from the national carrier (χ2(1, N = 42) = 2.80, p = .09).  In the Approach Scenario 
the respective percentages were 80% of major versus 27% of national pilots (χ2(1, N = 
25) = 6.84, p = .009).  Pilots from the two carriers also differed with respect to decision 
consistency on the two scenarios (i.e., consistently chose the safe or risky option, or were 
inconsistent in their decisions).  While decision consistency was low for pilots from the 
major carrier (41%), it was considerably higher for pilots from the national carrier (63%; 
χ2(2, N = 54) = 6.65, p = .04), especially concerning risky decisions (19% and 51% for 
the major and national carrier, respectively).  
Pilots’ decision frames.  In order to assess whether pilots’ decisions were 
influenced by decision frames descriptive and logistic regression analyses were 
performed.  In descriptive analyses we examined pilots’ stated motivations for their final 
decision.  According to prospect theory risk averse pilots should refer to flight safety and 
the safety benefits accruing from a change in plan (i.e., delay in departure in Takeoff 
Scenario, or diversion to alternate airport in Approach Scenario) while risk taking pilots 
should mention economic pressures and the economic costs (i.e., inconvenience to 
passengers, or future loss in revenues) associated with that change.  
 Table 3 lists the issues pilots mentioned just prior to their final decision in the 
Takeoff Scenario.  Contrary to prospect theory, both risk averse and risk taking pilots 
referred to safety-related issues, albeit with different emphases.  Most (67%) of the pilots 
who decided to delay the departure (= risk averse) focused on the movement of the 
thunderstorm (“coming closer,” “fast moving”) as well as on the intensity of the winds  
(“gusty”) and the fact that loss of airspeed had been reported.  In contrast, the majority 
(71.4%) of pilots who decided to take off (= risk taking) pointed to the fact that the 
thunderstorms were behind them, their departure path was clear, and the reported loss in 
airspeed was within limits and decreasing.  Still, just as their more cautious colleagues, 
most risk taking pilots did anticipate that they could encounter windshear on takeoff.  
They explicitly mentioned this possibility and/or (as shown in Table 2) prepared for it. 
However, unlike their more cautious colleagues, risk taking pilots apparently thought that 
they would be able to control this safety threat.  All but two of the pilots who chose to 
take off stated that they would use procedures specifically designed to mitigate the effect 
of windshear, such as delayed rotation, and increased takeoff speed. 
Table 3 also summarizes pilots’ final thoughts in the Approach Scenario.  As can 
be seen, safety-related issues again dominated pilots’ decision making.  Most (78.9%) of 
the pilots who decided to divert (= risk averse) stated that they were “getting low on fuel” 
and/or that weather conditions at the destination airport were “pretty bad” and “unlikely 
to improve.”  Similarly, 72% of the pilots who decided to continue with the approach (= 
risk taking) focused on their fuel status and/or the destination weather; in addition, 24% 
of them considered the time constraint imposed by the curfew.  As did their more 
cautious colleagues, most risk taking pilots indicated that “fuel [was] tight;” only three of 
them believed they had “enough fuel.” However, risk taking pilots presented a different 
view of the destination weather than risk averse pilots insofar as they emphasized that 
conditions were above the minimum requirement for the approach.  Implications 
associated with the decision alternatives --i.e., continuation of the approach or diversion 
to an alternate airport-- were explicitly mentioned by about a third of the risk averse and a 
quarter of the risk taking pilots.  Risk averse pilots predicted two negative consequences 
if they continued the approach:  deliberate use of reserve fuel thus violating a government 
regulation, or the possibility of having to conduct another missed approach due to the 
poor weather conditions, thereby depleting their fuel resources.  Similar concerns 
apparently motivated the behavior of risk taking pilots who mentioned strategies that 
would reduce fuel consumption on approach or reduce the required divert fuel.  Two of 
these pilots explicitly stated the rationale for these strategies.  Drawbacks of a diversion 
were addressed by three (= 12%) of the risk taking pilots; however, none concerned 
economic losses:  one pilot worried that the alternate airport was not a good option 
because a weather front was forecast to move in, and two pilots mentioned that they 
would not be able to get to their destination that same day if they diverted, and they “just 
would have to celebrate Christmas Eve somewhere else.”   
In addition to these descriptive analyses, logistic regression analyses were 
conducted to examine whether different issues dominated pilots’ thinking throughout a 
scenario and were associated with different decisions.  According to prospect theory we 
hypothesized that the more frequently pilots mentioned safety-related issues during their 
decision making, the more likely they would be to adopt a change in plan as their final 
decision.  Conversely, if economic considerations dominated pilots’ thinking they should 
be more likely to stay with their current flight plan. 
Logistic regression analyses included as predictors the categorical variable 
‘Airline’ plus the frequencies with which pilots talked about scenario-specific topics 
during their decision making.  In the Takeoff Scenario these included references to 
‘External Pressures,’ the ‘Operational Environment,’ and to a ‘Delay in Departure.’ 
References to safety-related topics (i.e., reported or anticipated airspeed loss, the 
departure weather, and flight safety) were combined into one predictor variable, called 
‘Safety Issues.’ References to the takeoff or to specific aspects of the departure (e.g., 
departure briefing and change of runway or departure path) were merged into the 
predictor variable ‘Takeoff-related Issues.’ The analysis of the Approach Scenario 
proceeded similarly.  All references to safety-related topics (i.e., fuel status, consumption 
and reserves, destination weather, or flight safety in general) were aggregated into the 
predictor variable ‘Safety Issues;’ references to the aircraft’s hold were combined with 
references to the operational environment into a predictor variable of the same name.  
The predictors ‘External Pressures,’ ‘Diversion-related Issues,’ and ‘ Approach-related 
Issues’  reflect the frequencies with which pilots referred to the corresponding topics.   
 Results of these analyses are summarized in Table 4 and indicate that contrary to 
prospect theory, risk averse and risk tolerant decisions were not significantly related to 
the frequency with which pilots mentioned safety-related issues or external pressures.  
Instead, their decisions in both scenarios were primarily determined by the extent to 
which they discussed available options.  In the Takeoff Scenario pilots’ final decision 
was predicted by the number of times they contemplated the possibility of taking a delay.  
As shown in Table 5, those who ultimately decided to do so, were more likely to mention 
this option while responding to events than those who chose to take off.    
Similarly, pilots’ decisions in the Approach Scenario reflected differences in how 
often pilots considered the possibility of landing at their destination and referred to 
matters related to the approach, such as the approach and landing checklist.  As can be 
seen in Table 5, pilots who chose to continue with the approach addressed these issues 
more frequently than pilots who decided to divert.  In addition to approach-related issues, 
safety-related talk was identified as a second predictor of pilots’ decisions, however, only 
after the effect of the approach-related talk was partialed out.  Moreover, the inclusion of 
this predictor did not improve the predictive value of the simpler model suggesting only 
minor differences between pilots in their concern for fuel status and destination weather; 
moreover, in the opposite direction than predicted by prospect theory. 
Pilots’ Risk Assessments.  In two logistic regression analyses we examined 
whether pilots’ decisions were determined by their risk assessment.  In particular we 
hypothesized that the more optimism (or the less pessimism) pilots expressed during their 
decision making, the more likely they were to choose the risky option.  Conversely, few 
optimistic (or frequent pessimistic) assessments should be predictive of risk averse 
preferences.   
Logistic regression analyses included the categorical variable ‘airline’ in addition 
to the frequencies of decision-relevant cognitions in pilots’ protocols (see Table 1).  The 
results of these analyses are summarized in Table 6; Table 7 provides the mean number 
of decision-relevant cognitions expressed by risk averse and risk taking pilots while 
responding to events.  In both scenarios pilots’ evaluations were found to be the strongest 
predictor of their final decisions.  In the Takeoff Scenario their decisions were 
significantly related to the number of negative evaluations they provided during their 
decision making.  Pilots who decided to delay the departure –thus favoring the safer 
course of action—had more negative things to say about the weather conditions and the 
reported airspeed loss than pilots who took the riskier option and continued with the 
departure.  Similar results were obtained in the analysis of pilots’ protocols for the 
Approach Scenario.  In this scenario, the number of positive evaluations during pilots’ 
decision making was the strongest predictor, followed by the number of negative 
evaluations.  That is, pilots who ultimately decided to continue with the approach (thus 
favoring the riskier option) were likely to be both more optimistic and less pessimistic 
about the situation than pilots who preferred the safer option and decided to divert.  
Discussion 
The results of the present study suggest that inappropriately optimistic risk 
assessment rather than a decision frame that highlights economic losses may be a 
dominant factor in pilots’ plan continuation errors.  Pilots in the dynamic decision task 
were risk taking or risk averse depending on their evaluation of the situation.  If their 
decisions had been the result of distinct decision frames, risk averse pilots should have 
focused on safety-related issues and emphasized the safety benefits of changing their 
flight plan while economic considerations and a concern for avoiding economic losses 
should have dominated the thinking of risk taking pilots.  
Instead we observed that flight safety featured prominently in pilots’ decision 
making, while economic pressures apparently did not influence their decisions.  In both 
scenarios most pilots were aware of the safety risk and took steps to counter it.  In 
addition to eliminating it altogether (e.g., by diverting to an alternate airport), they also 
“invented” solutions that went beyond the binary choice of ‘take it or leave it” typically 
presented to participants in framing studies.  These novel solutions reflect pilots’ attempts 
to take control of a risk and underscore the important role that risk management plays in 
real world decision making (Huber, 1997; Slovic, 1987).  
Which risk management strategy pilots ultimately chose in each scenario reflected 
differences in their assessment of the safety risk.  If pilots judged the safety threat to be 
“close to or beyond their comfort zone,” they adopted a plan that would assure safety but 
might incur economic or productivity losses.  On the other hand, if they judged the safety 
risk to be less serious, they modified their current plan to mitigate threats to flight safety 
while satisfying their company’s economic and productivity goals.  For example, they 
took precautions such as increasing takeoff speed to neutralize the effect of possible 
windshear, or they sought control over other factors in the situation, such as requesting 
priority handling to ensure that they would not become fuel critical.  In both situations, 
pilots’ normative model was to “go” (or continue) unless something occurred that 
surpassed a subjective threshold of safety.  This kind of thinking is most vividly 
illustrated in statements such as, “Nothing has come up that would make me decide not to 
make the departure.”   
Differences between pilots’ assessments of the safety risk were not significantly 
related to their experience levels or roles on the flight deck, as decisions did not vary by 
pilot age or crew position.  Nor did we find evidence that individual differences in risk 
attitude influenced pilots’ risk assessments, as pilots showed little consistency across 
scenarios in their preference for risky or risk averse options.   Instead, differences in risk 
assessment apparently reflected the inherent ambiguity of the problem cues and the 
uncertainties concerning outcomes.  Risk taking and risk averse pilots in both scenarios 
showed remarkably different interpretations of the “same” information.  In the Approach 
Scenario pilots who decided to continue with the approach expressed more optimism 
about the conditions, the likelihood of landing at their original destination, and making 
the curfew than pilots who decided to divert.   Similarly, those who decided to depart in 
the Takeoff Scenario evaluated the weather and airspeed loss more positively than did 
those who delayed the departure.  “Risk-takers” in this scenario emphasized the fact that 
the weather was behind them, still 8 miles away, and that the departure path was clear.  In 
addition, they focused on the quantity of airspeed loss, which they considered to be 
within limits, and interpreted the reported decrease in airspeed loss as an indication that 
weather conditions were improving.  In contrast, pilots who delayed the takeoff were 
primarily concerned about the airspeed loss per se and took the variability in reported 
airspeed loss to indicate unstable winds.  In line with this interpretation, they stressed the 
fact that the weather was getting closer.  Since they assumed that they could not outrun 
the storm and that the winds were becoming unpredictable, they decided not to risk a 
takeoff but instead to wait for the weather to pass. 
While our analyses did not reveal any differences between pilots from the two 
carriers in their decision processes, we did observe some differences in their decisions.  
Pilots from the major carrier seem to be more responsive to the specifics of a situation as 
their decisions varied across the scenarios.  In contrast, pilots from the national carrier 
were more likely to select the same option across the two scenarios, usually the riskier 
one.  In addition, they were less likely than their colleagues from the major carrier to 
mitigate the safety risk associated with their decision.  This pattern of findings may 
reflect differences between the two carriers in corporate climate, nature of their typical 
operations, pilot selection procedures, or training.   
Conclusions 
To prepare their pilots for flight risks, air carriers have emphasized training 
activities that were directed at specific threats, such as windshear and unusual-attitude 
recovery.  Recently carriers have developed courses to assist their pilots in coping with 
the kinds of ambiguous and uncertain situations that we have identified as leading to plan 
continuation errors (cf., Barcheski, 2001; Gunter, 2001).  These programs are grounded 
in documentation of actual threat encounters, including crew errors, and corrective pilot 
behavior.  However, one missing element is attention to factors that influence pilots’ risk 
perception and assessment, or to the basis for their risk management strategies.   
Our research indicates considerable variability in pilots’ assessments of risks, 
which in turn determined the extent to which pilots were willing to take or avoid a risk.  
Differences in risk assessment, moreover, were associated with the presence of 
ambiguous cues, dynamically changing conditions, and uncertain threat and action 
outcomes.  While these environmental characteristics invite multiple interpretations, 
pilots, like operators in other high-risk environments, may not realize that the same cues 
could lead to very different decisions and courses of actions.  Consequently, as one 
safeguard against plan continuation errors, risk management training should encourage 
pilots to verify their initial risk assessment and look for alternative interpretations, 
especially if their first inclination was to continue as originally planned.  
A second safeguard against plan continuation errors involves a change in pilots’ 
goal frame from a “Go-mode” to a “No-Go-mode.”  Our research suggests that pilots 
examine cues in the environment with their minds set on continuing with their current 
plan unless a perceived threat surpassed their subjective threshold of safety.  This strategy 
provides some protection against plan continuation errors as pilots seek to disconfirm 
rather than simply to confirm their original plan.  Nonetheless it may be too weak a 
barrier, especially in ambiguous and dynamically changing conditions since 
disconfirming cues may lack the strength or salience to induce a change in plan.  In 
general, people tend to hold on to their opinions and plans, and are likely to resist 
changes even if there is evidence to do so (cf., Davies, 1997; Jelalian & Miller, 1984). To 
guard against plan continuation errors in these situations, pilots may need to change their 
mindset.  That is, instead of asking themselves, “Why shouldn’t I continue?” which 
presupposes an inclination to “go,” it may be safer if they asked:  “Why should I 
continue?” which presupposes a willingness “not to go.” By changing their mindset to a 
no-go mode, pilots will raise their criterion for a “go” decision:  i.e., it will be more 
difficult to conclude that it is safe to go, if they looked at ambiguous cues with their mind 
set on “not-going,” than if they were inclined to “go” (see also Vaughn’s 1996 analysis of 
the Challenger accident).   
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Footnotes 
1)  One captain and three first officers did not indicate their age.  Two captains and three 
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Figure 1.  Alternative explanations of pilots’ risky decisions (I) in terms of their decision 
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Re-reading of material  
Queries 
 
“Divert plus FAR is 8,000 pounds.” 




Non-evaluative interpretation or 
projection of conditions/events  
 
“still the same there.“ [= weather at 
alternate] 
“It could dissipate.” 
POSITIVE EVALUATION 
Optimistic interpretation or projection 
 
“I am doing pretty good.“ 
“We’ve got 30 min. more fuel than we 
need.” 
NEGATIVE EVALUATION 
Pessimistic interpretation or projection 
 
“The weather at the alternate is worse than 
what we are right now.” 
“That’s not enough to do 4 turns [in the 
holding pattern].” 
CONSTRAINT 
Reference to issue that is of concern or 
limiting one’s decision 
 
“Want to make sure I have enough fuel.” 
“but we have a window of about a 30 
minute opportunity that we need to get in” 
PLAN 
Reference to future action, contingency 
plans, planning for the worst case 
 
“Once we get down to 8,000, we have to 
leave.” 
“At this point we would do our procedure 
for delaying rotation, and so if we do have 
any type of shear on final, then we’ll have 
this extra speed.” 
ACTION 
Statement of intention  
 
Reference to Standard Operational 
Procedure 
 
“There are two on final, so I am gonna wait 
for the next one to come in.” 
“We would do our published Missed 
Approach procedure.” 
DECISION “So I continue downwind.” 
Table 2 
Pilots’ Decisions by Scenario and Carrier (Major versus National) 
 






























Overview of the Reasons and Implications Pilots Provided to Motivate their Final 
Decision  
 
Note. Table lists number of pilots mentioning a given reason or implication. 
 DECISION IN TAKEOFF SCENARIO 
 
 
Delay Departure (N=15) 
(= Risk Averse) 
Take Off (N=42) 
(= Risk Taking) 
REASONS   
Airspeed Loss 1 16 
Location of Storm 
+  A i r s p eed Loss 
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+  Storm Intensity 









None  0 4 
OUTCOMES   
Safety Implication of T/O 
      Windshear/airspeed loss 
       Anticipates no problem  









None  3 25 
  DECISION IN APPROACH SCENARIO 
 Divert (N=33) 
 (= Risk Averse) 
Continue Approach (N=25) 
(=Risk Taking) 
REASONS   
Fuel 20 9 
Destination Weather 











OUTCOMES   
Safety Impl. if Continue 
      Use reserve fuel 
      Might not be able to land 
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Economic Impl. if Divert 


























































































Mean References to Scenario-Specific Topics by Risk Averse and Risk Taking Pilots 
during their Decision Making   
 
 DECISION IN TAKEOFF SCENARIO 
 Delay Departure 
(=Risk Averse) 
Take Off 
(= Risk Taking) 
Safety Issues 22.13    (2.64) 16.57    (1.73) 
External Pressures 2.00     (0.59) 1.05     (0.25) 
Delay in Departure 1.87     (0.45) 0.45     (0.12) 
Takeoff-Related Issues 6.67     (1.37) 6.10     (0.71) 
Operational Environment 2.80     (0.64) 2.74     (0.50) 
 DECISION IN THE APPROACH SCENARIO 
 Divert 
(= Risk Averse) 
Continue Approach 
(= Risk Taking) 
Safety Issues 21.55    (1.94) 22.60    (2.62) 
External Pressures 3.36     (0.66) 5.72     (0.94) 
Diversion-Related Issues 6.27     (1.05) 7.12     (1.08) 
Approach-Related Issues 5.79     (0.58) 10.36    (1.41) 
Operational Environment 8.73     (0.92) 10.28    (1.34) 
 
Note.  Numbers refer to mean numbers of idea units in protocols of risk averse and risk 
taking pilots that refer to a given topic.  Italicized numbers in parentheses provide 
standard deviations.   
 
Table 6 



















































































Mean Number of Decision-Relevant Cognitions by Risk Averse and Risk Taking Pilots 
during their Decision Making in the Takeoff Scenario and the Approach Scenario 
 
 DECISION IN TAKEOFF SCENARIO 
 Delay Departure 
(=Risk Averse) 
Take Off 
(= Risk Taking) 
Information Gathering 6.93    (1.16) 5.74    (0.63) 
Status Monitoring  7.60     (1.15) 7.07     (1.21) 
Positive Evaluation 2.67     (0.41) 4.52     (0.65) 
Negative Evaluation 7.60     (1.43) 2.12     (0.33) 
Constraint 6.80     (1.41) 3.17     (0.43) 
Plan 3.00     (0.64) 3.19     (0.42) 
Action 1.60     (031) 1.12     (0.25) 
 DECISION IN THE APPROACH SCENARIO 
 Divert 
(= Risk Averse) 
Continue Approach 
(= Risk Taking) 
Information Gathering 11.45    (1.42) 12.52    (1.67) 
Status Monitoring 12.06    (1.36) 12.24    (2.10) 
Positive Evaluation 3.30    (0.47) 8.32    (1.49) 
Negative Evaluation 5.27    (0.63) 3.44    (0.54) 
Constraint 8.36    (0.96) 11.24    (1.35) 
Plan 2.39    (0.32) 3.44    (0.44) 
Action 1.97    (0.32) 3.16    (0.67) 
 
Note.  Numbers refer to mean number of idea units in protocols of risk averse and risk 
taking pilots that serve a given cognitive function.  Italicized numbers in parentheses 
provide standard deviations.  
